Intrafamily Relations, Migration and Remittances

The ruling explanation for rural-urban migration in terms of expected intersectoral wage differentials grossly ignored the institutional importance of the family in migration decision making and remittances determination. Moreover, the decision making unit is an individual, the migrant, and the decision is independent. This paper attempts to develop a formal model of interdependent decision making within the context of the family with regard to migration and remittances. The migration process is viewed as a deliberate strategy designed by the family for maximizing its total welfare. The interrelationships between the migrant and the rest of the family are modelled as a self-enforcing co-operative game and the remittances are an a priori requirement for the distribution of gains in an implicit co-insurance system. The migration decision and the remittances are determined by the bargaining strength of the migrant and the rest of the family, who act to promote their own self-Interest. This new approach opens up new research interests.