Artha Vijnana: Journal of The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics

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Risk Aversion and the Proportional Solution in Two Person Bargaining Games


     

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For bargaining over the distribution of commodities or other riskiness outcomes, Nash's, solution predicts that risk aversion is a disadvantage in bargaining.
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  • Risk Aversion and the Proportional Solution in Two Person Bargaining Games

Abstract Views: 404  |  PDF Views: 0

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Abstract


For bargaining over the distribution of commodities or other riskiness outcomes, Nash's, solution predicts that risk aversion is a disadvantage in bargaining.


DOI: https://doi.org/10.21648/arthavij%2F1988%2Fv30%2Fi2%2F116381