![Open Access](https://i-scholar.in/lib/pkp/templates/images/icons/fulltextgreen.png)
![Restricted Access](https://i-scholar.in/lib/pkp/templates/images/icons/fulltextred.png)
![Open Access](https://i-scholar.in/lib/pkp/templates/images/icons/fulltextgreen.png)
![Open Access](https://i-scholar.in/lib/pkp/templates/images/icons/fulltext_open_medium.gif)
![Restricted Access](https://i-scholar.in/lib/pkp/templates/images/icons/fulltextred.png)
![Restricted Access](https://i-scholar.in/lib/pkp/templates/images/icons/fulltext_restricted_medium.gif)
Risk Aversion and the Proportional Solution in Two Person Bargaining Games
Subscribe/Renew Journal
For bargaining over the distribution of commodities or other riskiness outcomes, Nash's, solution predicts that risk aversion is a disadvantage in bargaining.
Subscription
Login to verify subscription
User
Font Size
Information
![](https://i-scholar.in/public/site/images/abstractview.png)
Abstract Views: 369
![](https://i-scholar.in/public/site/images/pdfview.png)
PDF Views: 0