Open Access Open Access  Restricted Access Subscription Access
Open Access Open Access Open Access  Restricted Access Restricted Access Subscription Access

Credence Services: Role of Liability System in India


Affiliations
1 Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Kanpur 208016, Uttar Pradesh, India
2 Long Island University, CW Post Campus, Brookville, New York, 11548, United States
     

   Subscribe/Renew Journal


Consumer sovereignty is a myth in the healthcare services because of high information costs and bounded rationality. Moreover, producer sovereignty oriented surgeries and absence of social security system enhance patients’ vulnerability in India. Thus, the aggrieved patients approach consumer courts against deficiency in the services of physicians. Our study shows that these courts had received 57.61 per cent of the patients’ grievances that were related to surgery. The grievances reveal that the erroneous surgeries inflict harm on patients. As a result, patients’ incur healthcare costs and sufferings due to permanent disability, apart from premature deaths. Courts were able to decide only nine per cent, 23 per cent and 30 per cent of the total disposed of cases in favour of consumers at the National Commission, the State Commission of Andhra Pradesh and the District Forum of Nellore, Andhra Pradesh, respectively. This is due to causational link problem. Our analysis further posits that the law’s delay and costs on vexatious claims raise concerns about efficiency of the courts. The insight obtained is to alter physician behaviour by establishing an appropriate incentive structure to practise patient oriented health care.
Subscription Login to verify subscription
User
Notifications
Font Size

  • Arlen, J. (2013), Economic Analysis of Medical Malpractice Liability and its Reform, In: Research Handbook on the Economic Analysis of Torts, Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, M.A., USA: Edward Elgar Press, pp. 33-68.
  • Brennan, T., et. al. (1996), Relation between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation, New England Journal of Medicine, 335(26): 1063-1067.
  • Cohen, T.H. and A.H. Kristen (2007), Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims in Seven States, 2000– 2004, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, NCJ 216339, pp. 1-12.
  • Currie, J., and W.B. MacLeod (2008), First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2): 795-830.
  • Danzon, P.M. (1983), LillardL, Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, Journal of Legal Studies, 12(2): 345–377.
  • ---------- (1991), Liability for Medical Malpractice, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(3): 51-69.
  • Farber, H.S. and M.J. White (1991), Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process, RAND Journal of Economics, 22(2): 199–217.
  • Friedman, D. (1982), What is Fair Compensation for Death or Injury? International Review of Law and Economics, 2(1): 81-93.
  • G’Sell-Macrez, F. (2011), Medical Malpractice and Compensation in France: Part I: The French rules of medical liability since the patients’ Rights Law of March 4, 2002, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 86(3): 1093-1123.
  • Jingwei, H.A. and J. Qian (2016), Explaining Medical Disputes in Chinese Public Hospitals: The Doctor–Patient Relationship and Its Implications for Health Policy Reforms, Health Economics, Policy and Law, 11(4): 359-378.
  • Kaplow, L. (1992), Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, Duke Law Journal, 42(3): 557- 629.
  • Kessler, D.P. (1996), Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organisation, 12(2): 432- 460.
  • ---------- (2011), Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(2): 93–110.
  • Kessler, D.P. and M. McClellan (1998), The Effects of Malpractice Pressure and Liability Reforms on Physicians' Perceptions of Medical Care, Law and Contemporary Problems, 60(1): 81-106.
  • Kim, B. (2007), The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures, Journal of Legal Studies, 36(S2): 79-119.
  • Kolstad, C., et. al. (1990), Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements, American Economic Review, 80(4): 888-911.
  • Li, H., et. al. (2014), Claims, Liabilities, Injuries and Compensation Payments of Medical Malpractice Litigation Cases in China from 1998 to 2011, BMC Health Services Research, 14(390): 1–9.
  • Ministry of Civil Supplies, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution (2013), Government of India, New Delhi, up to date 6.11.2013, http://ncdrc.nic.in/Statistics.html
  • Murali Prasad Panta, Business, Consumer and Government: Economic and Legal Perspectives (India and Germany), Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 2001.
  • Nelson, P. (1970), Information and the Consumer Behaviour, Journal of Political Economy, 78(2): 11- 329.
  • Shavell, S. (1980), An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, Journal of Legal Studies, 9(3): 463-516.
  • ---------- (1984), A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, Rand Journal of Economics, 15(2): 271- 280.
  • ---------- (1984), Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, Journal of Legal Studies, 13(2): 357- 374.
  • ---------- (1986), The Judgement Proof Problem, International Review of Law and Economics, 6(1): 45- 58.
  • ---------- (1995), The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, Journal of Legal Studies, 24(2): 380- 426.
  • Shurtz, I. (2014), Malpractice Law, Physician’s Financial Incentives, and Medical Treatment: How Do They Interact?, Journal of Law and Economics, 57(1): 1-29.
  • Vandersteegen, T., et. al. (2017), The Determinants of Defensive Medicine Practices in Belgium, Health Economics, Policy and Law, 12(3): 363-386.
  • Wittman, D. (1977), Prior Regulation vs. Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, Journal of Legal Studies, 6(1): 193- 211.
  • Wright, W.R. (1985), Causation in Tort Law, California Law Review, 73(6): 1735-1828.

Abstract Views: 513

PDF Views: 0




  • Credence Services: Role of Liability System in India

Abstract Views: 513  |  PDF Views: 0

Authors

Panta Murali Prasad
Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Kanpur 208016, Uttar Pradesh, India
Manoj Dalvi
Long Island University, CW Post Campus, Brookville, New York, 11548, United States

Abstract


Consumer sovereignty is a myth in the healthcare services because of high information costs and bounded rationality. Moreover, producer sovereignty oriented surgeries and absence of social security system enhance patients’ vulnerability in India. Thus, the aggrieved patients approach consumer courts against deficiency in the services of physicians. Our study shows that these courts had received 57.61 per cent of the patients’ grievances that were related to surgery. The grievances reveal that the erroneous surgeries inflict harm on patients. As a result, patients’ incur healthcare costs and sufferings due to permanent disability, apart from premature deaths. Courts were able to decide only nine per cent, 23 per cent and 30 per cent of the total disposed of cases in favour of consumers at the National Commission, the State Commission of Andhra Pradesh and the District Forum of Nellore, Andhra Pradesh, respectively. This is due to causational link problem. Our analysis further posits that the law’s delay and costs on vexatious claims raise concerns about efficiency of the courts. The insight obtained is to alter physician behaviour by establishing an appropriate incentive structure to practise patient oriented health care.

References





DOI: https://doi.org/10.21648/arthavij%2F2020%2Fv62%2Fi1%2F194692