Artha Vijnana: Journal of The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics

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IPR Regulatory Policy, Tariff and Entry Modes of MNC


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1 Department of Economics, Sushil Kar College, Ghoshpur, 24 Parganas(S) 743330, West Bengal, India
     

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The paper links the optimal IPR rate andtariff rate chosen by a less developed country (LDC) government to the mode of entry of a multinational corporation (MNC) in it. The MNC can either export or fragment the production structure by shifting assembly-line units to the LDC where the cost of assembling the product is lower. Under fragmentation, a commercial pirate can copy the product with a positive probability and the MNC incurs anti-copying investment to deter piracy. The results show that under different combinations of copying, the probability of the pirate and cost incentive of fragmentation of different equilibrium configurations can be chosen.
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  • IPR Regulatory Policy, Tariff and Entry Modes of MNC

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Authors

Nilanjana Biswas (Mitra)
Department of Economics, Sushil Kar College, Ghoshpur, 24 Parganas(S) 743330, West Bengal, India

Abstract


The paper links the optimal IPR rate andtariff rate chosen by a less developed country (LDC) government to the mode of entry of a multinational corporation (MNC) in it. The MNC can either export or fragment the production structure by shifting assembly-line units to the LDC where the cost of assembling the product is lower. Under fragmentation, a commercial pirate can copy the product with a positive probability and the MNC incurs anti-copying investment to deter piracy. The results show that under different combinations of copying, the probability of the pirate and cost incentive of fragmentation of different equilibrium configurations can be chosen.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21648/arthavij%2F2020%2Fv62%2Fi3%2F203585