Journal of Intellectual Property Rights

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Licensing of Standard Essential Patents on FRAND Terms in India


Affiliations
1 School of Law & Governance, Central University of South Bihar, Gaya-824 236, Bihar, India
2 Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-2210 05, UP, India
 

The standardized technology seems to increase efficiency and reduce costs associated with wide variety of product and services in the field of information and communication. The idea of standard-essential patents (SEPs) is now getting more attention in patent litigations in different economies due to requirement of its licensing on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. The telecommunications industry has recently seen a significant increase in costly patent litigations. This smartphone patent war needs amicable resolution amongst different stakeholder. The scope of the present paper includes examination of the concept of SEPs and comparison of the various modes of ensuring their availability on FRAND terms. The position of law in different jurisdictions is presented keeping in mind the interest of all stakeholders and the recent judicial trends in India. Authors have followed an evaluative method in which case law forms the basis of discussion. The paper argues that the existing legal framework in India on the grant of injunctions and the licensing of SEPs on strictly FRAND terms appears to be adequate, however, the recent trend of litigation seems conflicting as one party wishes to enforce FRAND term and opposite party is arguing that the terms are anti-competitive.

Keywords

Information And Communication Technology, Standardized Technologies, Standard-essential Patents, Standard Setting Organizations, Anti-Trust Law, Competition Law and FRAND Terms, Standards-Development Organization, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, FRAND Licensing.
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  • Licensing of Standard Essential Patents on FRAND Terms in India

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Authors

Digvijay Singh
School of Law & Governance, Central University of South Bihar, Gaya-824 236, Bihar, India
Rajnish Kumar Singh
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-2210 05, UP, India

Abstract


The standardized technology seems to increase efficiency and reduce costs associated with wide variety of product and services in the field of information and communication. The idea of standard-essential patents (SEPs) is now getting more attention in patent litigations in different economies due to requirement of its licensing on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. The telecommunications industry has recently seen a significant increase in costly patent litigations. This smartphone patent war needs amicable resolution amongst different stakeholder. The scope of the present paper includes examination of the concept of SEPs and comparison of the various modes of ensuring their availability on FRAND terms. The position of law in different jurisdictions is presented keeping in mind the interest of all stakeholders and the recent judicial trends in India. Authors have followed an evaluative method in which case law forms the basis of discussion. The paper argues that the existing legal framework in India on the grant of injunctions and the licensing of SEPs on strictly FRAND terms appears to be adequate, however, the recent trend of litigation seems conflicting as one party wishes to enforce FRAND term and opposite party is arguing that the terms are anti-competitive.

Keywords


Information And Communication Technology, Standardized Technologies, Standard-essential Patents, Standard Setting Organizations, Anti-Trust Law, Competition Law and FRAND Terms, Standards-Development Organization, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, FRAND Licensing.

References