Author Details

This paper is the first to evaluate the effectiveness of youth financial literacy education programs in an environment of a government mandate to embed financial literacy education across the curriculum in grades four to twelve. It presents results from a unique data set of survey and focus group responses about the active efforts by a non-profit organization, the Investor Education Fund, to implement a suite of support tools designed to make teachers more effective at delivering financial literacy education in the classroom. Overall, the results suggest the IEF is effective at improving financial literacy awareness, intentions, and actual behaviors for both teachers and students.

Keywords

Financial Literacy, Focus Group Study, Education Program.

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References

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An Empirical Evaluation of the Determinants of Executive Perks at S&P 500 Firms

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Authors

Andrew Carrothers ¹

Affiliations
1 School of Business at the University of Prince Edward Island, CA

Source

Global Journal of Research in Management, Vol 7, No 2 (2017), Pagination: 1-27

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of executive perks at S&P 500 firms using manually collected panel data. CEOs receive perks more frequently and at higher levels than other named executive officers (NEOs). In general, S&P 500 firms with larger growth opportunities, realized growth, stock returns, and return on assets are less likely to provide perks and provide lower levels of perks when they do. Firms with powerful CEOs are more likely to provide perks. Firm size and executive monetary compensation are the most influential determinants of the value of perks. Overall, tenure and gender do not impact the likelihood or value of perk compensation at S&P 500 companies.

Keywords

Perquisites, Executive Compensation, Competitive Market, Private Benefits.

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References

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