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Unifying Views on Corporate Capital Structure Dynamics: A Research Letter


Affiliations
1 Department of Commerce, Rabindra Mahavidyalaya, Champadanga, Hooghly, West Bengal, India
2 Department of Commerce, The University of Burdwan, West Bengal, India
     

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The present paper considers the issue of corporate strategic financing choices from the dynamic views, and it puts forwards a unifying view, where the view logically argues that the issue of financing decision is a combined choice of the firms' decision set of "timestate-focus". The view theoretically argues that firms' capital structure decisions are particularly of some short of reconciliations on the part of the firms between the propositions of the static trade-off (STO) theory, the pecking order (PO) theory, the dynamic trade-off (DTO) theory, and the market timing (MT) theory. The empirical observations also support the said theoretical views and thereby confirm the firms' dynamic behaviors and provide robust supports in favor of the dynamic unifying view of firms' financing choices.

Keywords

Corporate Financing, Dynamic Unifying View, Reconciliation of Theories
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  • Unifying Views on Corporate Capital Structure Dynamics: A Research Letter

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Authors

Paritosh Chandra Sinha
Department of Commerce, Rabindra Mahavidyalaya, Champadanga, Hooghly, West Bengal, India
Santanu Kumar Ghosh
Department of Commerce, The University of Burdwan, West Bengal, India

Abstract


The present paper considers the issue of corporate strategic financing choices from the dynamic views, and it puts forwards a unifying view, where the view logically argues that the issue of financing decision is a combined choice of the firms' decision set of "timestate-focus". The view theoretically argues that firms' capital structure decisions are particularly of some short of reconciliations on the part of the firms between the propositions of the static trade-off (STO) theory, the pecking order (PO) theory, the dynamic trade-off (DTO) theory, and the market timing (MT) theory. The empirical observations also support the said theoretical views and thereby confirm the firms' dynamic behaviors and provide robust supports in favor of the dynamic unifying view of firms' financing choices.

Keywords


Corporate Financing, Dynamic Unifying View, Reconciliation of Theories

References