Evolutionary approach to stackelberg game based demand response for electric vehicle charging

In this era of industrialization and modernization, global warming and climate change are pressing issues. In order to address that transportation electrification seems to be a potential solution owing to much lower carbon and nitrogen oxides emissions as opposed to their Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles counterparts. But to realize this customers need to be motivated to adopt this new technology. There should be opportunity for customers to exploit the elastic nature of EV load by participating in the electricity market and adjust their consumption levels such that they derive maximum satisfaction with the price at which they buy the electricity. This introduces the concept of Demand response, which aims at reduction of power generation costs and electricity bills by allowing con- trol of electricity consumption through electricity prices. This interaction between retailer and customers leads to a conflict of interest as every entity aims at maximizing their benefits. In this study, a Stackelberg game model has been developed where the retailer sets electricity price with the knowledge of EV customers’ behavior so as to maximize its profit and the EV customers set consumption level to maximize their payoffs. We have proven that game settles down at an equilibrium point where EV charging requirements are met.