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Science-Based Mandatory Standards and the Implementation Gap:The Case of Bottled Water Regulations in India


Affiliations
1 School of Ecology and Environment Studies, Nalanda University, Nalanda 803 116, India
 

Science-based standards and regulation-making is not a new phenomenon in India. In fact, Indian regulatory institutions have been developing standards and evolving in multiple areas over many decades. However, even mandatory standards are not easily enforceable in several cases, and often an ‘implementation gap’ has been reported. The present article explores this critical aspect of regulation-making exercise in India by considering the case of bottled water. The article analyses the regulatory governance of bottled water quality standards promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Standards. The findings could be useful for Indian industry, regulators, science administrators and the government.

Keywords

Bottled Water, Implementation Gap, Regulation-Making, Science-Based Standards.
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  • Science-Based Mandatory Standards and the Implementation Gap:The Case of Bottled Water Regulations in India

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Authors

Aviram Sharma
School of Ecology and Environment Studies, Nalanda University, Nalanda 803 116, India

Abstract


Science-based standards and regulation-making is not a new phenomenon in India. In fact, Indian regulatory institutions have been developing standards and evolving in multiple areas over many decades. However, even mandatory standards are not easily enforceable in several cases, and often an ‘implementation gap’ has been reported. The present article explores this critical aspect of regulation-making exercise in India by considering the case of bottled water. The article analyses the regulatory governance of bottled water quality standards promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Standards. The findings could be useful for Indian industry, regulators, science administrators and the government.

Keywords


Bottled Water, Implementation Gap, Regulation-Making, Science-Based Standards.

References





DOI: https://doi.org/10.18520/cs%2Fv114%2Fi01%2F29-33