Strong Nash Equilibrium Method for Collusion-Resistant Routing in Noncooperative Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

In wireless ad hoc networks, routing needs cooperation of nodes. How to send the data source to destination, Since nodes often belong to different users, it is highly important to provide incentives for them to cooperate. However most existing studies of the incentive-compatible routing problem focus on individual nodes incentives, assuming that no subset of them would collude. In this paper we present a systematic study of collusion-resistant routing in noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks. we consider two standard solution concepts. Group Strategyproofness and Strong Nash Equilibrium. We show that achieving Group Strategyproofness is impossible, while achieving Strong Nash Equilibrium is possible. More specifically, we design a scheme that is guaranteed to converge to a Strong Nash Equilibrium and prove that the total payment needed is bounded. We consider shortest path include source and destination node. Second we less power control. In addition, we propose a cryptographic method that prevents profit transfer among colluding nodes, as long as they do not fully trust each other unconditionally. This method makes our scheme widely applicable in practice. Experiments show that our solution is collusion-resistant and consider node cost reduced node then with out data loss transfer the data ending point has good performance.