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The Effect of Segregation in Non-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma


Affiliations
1 University College of Southeast Norway, Norway
 

This article consolidates the idea that non-random pairing can promote the evolution of cooperation in a non-repeated version of the prisoner’s dilemma. This idea is taken from[1], which presents experiments utilizing stochastic simulation. In the following it is shown how the results from [1] is reproducible by numerical analysis. It is also demonstrated that some unexplained findings in [1], is due to the methods used.

Keywords

Evolution, Cooperation, Segregation, Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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  • The Effect of Segregation in Non-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract Views: 398  |  PDF Views: 169

Authors

Thomas Nordli
University College of Southeast Norway, Norway

Abstract


This article consolidates the idea that non-random pairing can promote the evolution of cooperation in a non-repeated version of the prisoner’s dilemma. This idea is taken from[1], which presents experiments utilizing stochastic simulation. In the following it is shown how the results from [1] is reproducible by numerical analysis. It is also demonstrated that some unexplained findings in [1], is due to the methods used.

Keywords


Evolution, Cooperation, Segregation, Prisoner’s Dilemma.

References