Journal of Intellectual Property Rights

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Old Town Road of Copyright's Subject Matter and Aesthetics


Affiliations
1 Department of IntellectualProperty Law, Uniwersytet Jagielloński Kraków, Poland
 

The paper refers to the most discussed and controversial element of the copyright’s legal system: the definition of subject matter and its interpretation. Inspired by some post-modern aesthetics theories, the aim of the paper is to open a discussion in respect to the notion of work in copyright and its impact on art and every-day life. The first part of the paper presents a brief analysis of copyright’s struggles with its subject matter, followed than with an analysis of contemporary trends in aesthetics, in particular the functional and the institutional definition of art. The second part provides examples of manifestations and similarities between legal system and modern aesthetical concepts. Finally, the author considers whether - and if so, to what extent - the implementation of new aesthetic approaches could be helpful in the system of copyright.

Keywords

Copyright, Berne Convention, Digital Single Market, Aesthetics, Copyright Subject Matter, New Technologies.
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  • Author of the used sample is artist known as YoungKio and alone the sample is an instrumental version of the song “34 Ghost IV” by the Nine Inch Nails, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Old Town Road (accessed on 27 April 2020).

  • As reported by the Rolling Stone magazine: Billboard did not publicly announce the change, but in a statement released to Rolling Stone, the publication said that “upon further review, it was determined that ‘Old Town Road’ by Lil Nas X does not currently merit inclusion on Billboard‘s country charts. When determining genres, a few factors are examined, but first and foremost is musical composition. While ‘Old Town Road’ incorporates references to country and cowboy imagery, it does not embrace enough elements of today’s country music to chart in its current version.” https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/lil-nasxold-town-road-810844/ (accessed on 27 April 2020).

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  • For instance, in French Copyright Code, a work is understood as a creation of a human mind (Art. L112-1); in the German Copyright Act, protected subject matter is considered any work of personal and intellectual creation (§2 UrhG - German Copyright Act).

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  • Work titled: Vertical Earth Kilometer (Vertikaler Erdkilometer), created by Walter De Maria in 1977 at Friedrichplatz in the city of Kassel, Germany; the work constitutes a one-kilometer-long brass rod, two inches in diameter, drilled into the spot at the main square in the city. The rod's circular top, flush to the earth's surface, is framed by a two-meter square plate of red sandstone. Due to its nature it is impossible to see the whole “work” (the rod stays under the surface); Welsch W, Ästhetik und Anästhetikin, ÄsthetikImWiderstreit:InterventionenZumWerk von Jean-François Lyotard ed. by Pries Ch, Welsch W (De Gruyter 1995), 67-88.

  • "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) at 252; Walker R K &Depoorter B, Unavoidable aesthetic judgments in Copyright Law: A community of practice standard, Northwestern University Law Review, 109 (2015) 343;

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  • Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (hereinafter as DSM Directive).

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  • Davies S, Definitions of Art (Cornell University Press 1991) 54.

  • The internal and the external evidences, Beardsley M, Redefining Art, in The Aesthetic Point of View, ed. by Wreen M J, Callen D M (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 20; Wimsatt W K, Beardsley M, The Intentional Fallacy in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetryed by Wimsatt WK, Beardsley M (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press 1954).

  • Beardsley M, Redefining Art, in The Aesthetic Point of View, ed. by Wreen M J, Callen D M (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 18-19, 21, 25-26.

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  • Danto A, Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1981).

  • Danto A, Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1981)13.

  • Due to the fact that creating of a work ought to be an act of creation and not a simple use of already existing objects, Davies S, Definitions of Art (Cornell University Press 1991) 71-72; Tilghman B, Wittgenstein, Games, and Art, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 31 (1972) 517-524; Davies S, Philosophical Perspectives on Art, (Oxford Univ. Press 2007), 45.

  • Davies S, Definitions of Art (Cornell University Press 1991) 71.

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  • Walker R K &Depoorter B, Unavoidable aesthetic judgments in Copyright Law: A community of practice standard, Northwestern University Law Review, 109 (2015) 356 fn 107.

  • For instance some artistic performances by Marina Abramović and Ulay.

  • Barron A, Copyright Law and the claims of art, Intellectual Property Quarterly, 4 (2002) 368; Cohen A B, Copyright Law and the myth of objectivity: The idea-expression dichotomy and the inevitability of artistic value judgments, Indiana Law Journal, 1 (1990) 175, 185; Booton D, Framing pictures: Defining art in UK Copyright Law, Intellectual Property Quarterly, 1(2003) 38; Wimsatt W K, Beardsley M, The Intentional Fallacy in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetryed by Wimsatt WK, Beardsley M (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press 1954) 201.

  • Walker R K &Depoorter B, Unavoidable aesthetic judgments in Copyright Law: A community of practice standard, Northwestern University Law Review, 109 (2015) 356 fn 105.

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  • Eaton M, Art and Non-Art, Reflections on an Orange Crate and a Moose Call (Associated University Presses, Inc. 1983) 36.

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  • Dickie G, The Art Circle: A Theory of Art (New York: Haven 1984) 80-82.

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  • Davies S, Definitions of Art (Cornell University Press 1991) 91.

  • Dickie G, The Institutional Theory of Art in Theories of Art Today ed. by Caroll N, (Wisconsin 2000) 93-108; compare it with: Dickie G, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1974) at 34; and with Dickie G, The Art Circle: A Theory of Art (New York: Haven 1984) 80-82; Levinson J, Defining art historically, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 19 (1979) 235-236.

  • Van Gompel S &Lavik E, Quality, merit, aesthetics and purpose: An inquiry into EU Copyright Law’s Eschewal of other criteria than originality, Revue Internationale du Droitd’Auteur, 19 (2013) 100.

  • Van Gompel S &Lavik E, Quality, merit, aesthetics and purpose: An inquiry into EU Copyright Law’s Eschewal of other criteria than originality, Revue Internationale du Droitd’Auteur, 19 (2013) 113.

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  • Polish Supreme Court Decision on 22.06.2010, case no. IV CSK 359/09.

  • Following decisions by the Polish Courts of Appeal (case no.): I ACA 724/17, I ACa 942/15, I ACA 1217/15, I ACz 2544/15, I ACa 121/15, VI ACa 1200/14, , I ACA 1223/13, I ACz 584/13, I ACa 809/08, I ACA 227/08, I ACA 800/07, VI ACA 1688/16; also by the Polish Supreme Court (case no.): V CSK 202/13, IV CSK 359/09, I CK 281/05; and IV CK 763/04.

  • Merlet et al. v Mothercare Public Ltd, CHD 13 APR 1984, (1986) RPC 115. The plaintiff claimed copyright infringement by the defendant in having copied her ‘raincosy’, a baby’s cape. The claim has failed in the end. In court’s opinion, the object was not eligible for copyright protection as a sculpture (category of artistic works).

  • Ravenscroft v Herbert and New English Library Ltd (1980) FSR 363, 372 (CA): the Court supported a standard that included also investigation into a presumptive intent of author. See also a further investigation into intent and social context of work by Pila J, Copyright and its categories of original works, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 30 (2010) 229, 247, 251.

  • (1997) FSR 718.

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  • (1975) RPC 31; compare with Merchandising Corp v Harpbond(1983) FSR 32, 42; Pila J, An intentional view of the copyright work, Modern Law Review, 71 (2008) 535; Booton D, Framing pictures: Defining art in UK Copyright Law, Intellectual Property Quarterly, 1(2003) 40-41, Booton D, Art in the Law of Copyright: Legal determinations of artistic merit under United Kingdom Copyright Law, Art Antiquity & Law, 1 (1996) 125, 138.

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  • 111 US 53 (1884).

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  • 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1992); compare with two cases: Rogers v Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the unauthorized use of a photograph in the creation of a sculpture was not parodic fair use), and with Blanch v Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding defendant’s work sufficiently transformative to justify fair use defense).

  • 632 F.2d 989 at 990: the Court held that a design for ‚belt buckles’ is eligible for copyright protection because the design included „conceptually (…) separable sculptural elements” that are usually unnecessary to its function as a belt buckle; Walker R K &Depoorter B, Unavoidable aesthetic judgments in Copyright Law: A community of practice standard, Northwestern University Law Review, 109 (2015) 343; Finn P J, Handbook of Intellectual Property Claims Remedies [Wolters Kluwer 2015] 3-9; compare with Carol Barnhart, Inc. v Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985).

  • Vermaat et al. v Boncrest Ltd (2001) FSR 43.

  • Burge v Swarbrick (2007) HCA 17 at 63: “The answer to the question whether the Plug is a "work of artistic craftsmanship" cannot be controlled by evidence from MrSwarbrick of his aspirations or intentions when designing and constructing the Plug. His evidence was admissible”.

  • Polish Court of Appeal (Poznań) on 9.02.2012, case no. I ACa 968/11.

  • Polish Supreme Court on 15.11.2012, case no. II CKN 1289/00.

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  • Elkin-Koren N, Of scientific claims and proprietary rights: Lessons from the Dead Sea Scrolls Case, Houston Law Review, 38 (2001) 445: “What is art? That would also depend upon recognition by the art community and society's "authorized" art institutions. In this sense, both the scientific project and the artistic project depend upon a notion of communicability and communal acceptance”.

  • Plix Products v Frank M. Winstone5 IPR 156.

  • D’Almaine v Boosey (1835) 1 Y. & C. Ex. 288; Austin v Columbia Gramophone Co Ltd (1917-1923) Mac.C.C. 398, Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v Bron (1963) Ch. 587; Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Service Ltd (1934) Ch. 593.

  • And even though the information contained in a work might be the same, Anacon Corp Ltd v Environmental Research Technology Ltd (1994) FSR 659.

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  • Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others, C-201/13, (CJEU September 3, 2014); Durant A, Substantial similarity of expression in copyright infringement actions: A linguistic perspective in Copyright and Piracy: an interdisciplinary critique ed. by Bently L, Davies J, Ginsburg J C, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2010) 19: “And, at a fourth level, the court must decide whether even the parodist has copied only that part of the "heart" of the copyrighted work that is necessary to "conjure it up" in the mind of the listener or viewer. That certainly requires making a most demanding psycho-aesthetic judgment”.

  • (2000) EMLR 363 at 38; compare with Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks & Spencer (2000) 4 All ER 239 (CA) at 44.

  • Criticised by Bently L, Sherman B, Gangjee D & Johnson P, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, 5th ed 2018), 230.

  • Quote from the book “Alice in Wonderland” by Lewis Carroll.


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  • Old Town Road of Copyright's Subject Matter and Aesthetics

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Authors

Ewa Laskowska-Litak
Department of IntellectualProperty Law, Uniwersytet Jagielloński Kraków, Poland

Abstract


The paper refers to the most discussed and controversial element of the copyright’s legal system: the definition of subject matter and its interpretation. Inspired by some post-modern aesthetics theories, the aim of the paper is to open a discussion in respect to the notion of work in copyright and its impact on art and every-day life. The first part of the paper presents a brief analysis of copyright’s struggles with its subject matter, followed than with an analysis of contemporary trends in aesthetics, in particular the functional and the institutional definition of art. The second part provides examples of manifestations and similarities between legal system and modern aesthetical concepts. Finally, the author considers whether - and if so, to what extent - the implementation of new aesthetic approaches could be helpful in the system of copyright.

Keywords


Copyright, Berne Convention, Digital Single Market, Aesthetics, Copyright Subject Matter, New Technologies.

References