Many cars have the advantage of transporting people or object from one location to another accurately. The objective of designing roads is to facilitate the movement of cars, while the purpose of constructing parking spaces is to allow cars to park in still. Even though roads and parking spaces serve different purposes, parking spaces often appear next to busy traffic road. Such design not only sacrifices the safety of roads for cars to travel but also worsens the traffic in terms of vehicle volume and traveling time, hence, increasing social costs. The car parking space match-making mechanism reported in this study is designed in the point of view of the government, in which owners of private parking can offer their spaces to others who are in need during non-use period. Alternatively, the mechanism can also induce people to purchase private parking spaces, which can be offered to those who are in need in exchange of rental fees. These incentives, therefore, support the formation and operation of this match-making mechanism. Through the operability of this mechanism, private parking space owners are more willing to transfer their parking space property right to the government for management, which in turn increases the number of parking spaces available for the government. Moreover, the parking spaces offered in this match-making mechanism are interchangeable.
The lifetime and stability of the mechanism from “nothing” to “something” depend on whether or not the interchangeability of such mechanism can catalyze subsequent operations spontaneously as well as the degree of catalytic power. If the mechanism possesses spontaneous catalytic power for sustainability, and the catalytic process has the “good” to benefit other people without compromising your own interest, the formation of this mechanism will be regarded as “good formation”. On the other hand, if the mechanism cannot be catalyzed spontaneously, occasional operation is needed. Anything that is created from advertisement will eventually be gone. The mechanism reported in this study not only is regarded as “good formation”, the target function can be designed depending on the beneficiary, giving the flexibility for selection. In other words, the rate of car space rental per unit time can be determined depending on the weighted average of interest from different groups as shown below.
- Interest of the group who need to rent car parking space
- Interest of the group who transfer their private parking space to the government for management during non-use period
- Interest of the companies assigned by the government to handle car parking space match making (the company can be listed company at over-the-counter market or stock exchange market)