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Dynamics in a Plant Level Bargaining Process & Wage Determination


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1 XLRI Jamshedpur, Xavier School of Management, Jamshedpur 831001, India
2 Minton Consulting Pvt.Ltd., Hyderabad, 500081, India
     

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In this paper, the authors narrate the experiences of union and management in six months long wage negotiations to explain if the factors that trigger a type of behavior displayed by parties across table are predictable and guided by sheer rationality. The narrative suggests that most behaviors displayed by parties, strategies adopted, tactics used and roles chosen were within the limits of rationality with very few exceptions. While we are aware of the determinants of the negotiated outcome that exists in extant literature, it is much needed to check if the behavioral manifestations that appear are truly unreasonable or falsely portrayed as irrational to reduce predictability of party’s demand or offer in subsequent rounds.
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  • Dynamics in a Plant Level Bargaining Process & Wage Determination

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Authors

Santanu Sarkar
XLRI Jamshedpur, Xavier School of Management, Jamshedpur 831001, India
Aashish Singh
Minton Consulting Pvt.Ltd., Hyderabad, 500081, India

Abstract


In this paper, the authors narrate the experiences of union and management in six months long wage negotiations to explain if the factors that trigger a type of behavior displayed by parties across table are predictable and guided by sheer rationality. The narrative suggests that most behaviors displayed by parties, strategies adopted, tactics used and roles chosen were within the limits of rationality with very few exceptions. While we are aware of the determinants of the negotiated outcome that exists in extant literature, it is much needed to check if the behavioral manifestations that appear are truly unreasonable or falsely portrayed as irrational to reduce predictability of party’s demand or offer in subsequent rounds.

References