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Leverage & Trade Unionism in Indian Industry: An Empirical Note
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Market power in the hands of a supplier such as a labor union affects an industrys capital structure. Using panel data techniques for 1992-2004, this note shows that industries indeed appear to employ financial leverage strategically to influence collective bargaining decisions. The estimates imply that strategic incentives from input markets have a substantial impact on financing decisions.
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