Indian Journal of Industrial Relations: Economics & Social Dev.

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Some Inherent Challenges to Good Corporate Governance


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1 Centre for Corporate Governance & Citizenship, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore 500076, India
     

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Are corporations, in general, amenable to good governance? Are there inherent incompatibilities between good governance and the corporate format of organizations? How can these be addressed satisfactorily without overregulation that might impair entrepreneurial potential? These are some of the nagging issues being explored in this paper. The author recapitulates the conventional principal - agent paradigm in corporations and flags some of the more important issues that militate against good governance. The paper then deals with the current governance frameworks and identifies some of the countervailing measures that best-practice prescriptions advocate. It then explores a few out-of-the-box measures that might serve as potential enablers of better governance and discusses both their justification and impact.
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  • Some Inherent Challenges to Good Corporate Governance

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Authors

N. Balasubramanian
Centre for Corporate Governance & Citizenship, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore 500076, India

Abstract


Are corporations, in general, amenable to good governance? Are there inherent incompatibilities between good governance and the corporate format of organizations? How can these be addressed satisfactorily without overregulation that might impair entrepreneurial potential? These are some of the nagging issues being explored in this paper. The author recapitulates the conventional principal - agent paradigm in corporations and flags some of the more important issues that militate against good governance. The paper then deals with the current governance frameworks and identifies some of the countervailing measures that best-practice prescriptions advocate. It then explores a few out-of-the-box measures that might serve as potential enablers of better governance and discusses both their justification and impact.

References